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‘The role of professional judgement in social work assessment: a comparison between 
Norway and England’ 
 
Abstract: 
Good quality assessment has a significant role to play in contributing to better outcomes for 
children in need of protection, so it is important to understand what supports best practice. 
This paper focuses on the role of professional judgement in assessment, and compares two 
very different national approaches. In England, governmental responses to perceived failings 
in the child protection system have led to a highly proceduralised and bureaucratised system 
and a corresponding down playing of the role of professional judgement. In Norway, 
professional discretion and judgement have been seen as key to the assessment process, 
and governmental response to criticism of child protection practice has been to support 
their use through provision of increased resources. However, too much emphasis on 
professional judgement and too little procedure may be as problematic as the reverse 
(Report of Auditor General of Norway, 2012). So this paper explores the different ways in 
which professional judgement is understood and addressed in each system and asks what 
we can learn from them in terms of best assessment practice. Acknowledging child 
protection as a ‘wicked problem’, we propose a model of Grounded Professional Judgement 
based on notions of epistemic responsibility and accountability to support the exercise of 
professional judgement in situations of uncertainty. 
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Introduction 
A common feature of child protection systems in the western world is the process of 
assessment that takes place after a referral of concern is received. Good quality assessment 
has a significant role to play in contributing to better outcomes for children in need of 
support and protection, and therefore it is important to understand what supports best 
practice in this regard. At its simplest, the process of assessment refers to the gathering of 
information to provide the basis for decision making, planning and resource allocation 
(Kirton, 2009), but in practice, the ‘doing’ of assessment has proved to be less 
straightforward, and the assessment of a child and their family in terms of risk and need has 
been identified as one of the most controversial and complex areas in child protection 
(Holland, 2010: 01). Yet the way of responding to this complexity has been markedly 
different in England and Norway, particularly in relation to expectations about the use of 
professional judgement. 
 
In England, a national assessment framework (Department of Health, Department for 
Education & Employment, 2000) was introduced and there has been heavy reliance on ‘top-
down forms of performance management [which have] marginalised the role of social work 
in children’s services’ (Parton, 2011: 855). Alongside the increased bureaucratisation and 
proceduralisation of assessment (Munro, 2011; White, Wastell, Broadhurst & Hall, 2010), 
the room for, and role of, professional judgement in assessment has been reduced. In 
Norway, there are no substantive guidelines for social workers carrying out assessments, and 
it is assumed that the process and decision-making are guided by the use of professional 
judgement.  Professional judgement is viewed normatively and the concept is invoked 
without the need for further clarification of either the reflective process that supports it or 
its content (Samsonsen & Willumsen, 2014).  
 
A recent government-commissioned review of child protection in England (Munro, 2011) 
emphasised the need to reduce mechanisms of top-down control, to make space for 
reasoning and reflectivity. At more or less the same time, a similar report in Norway focusing 
on child protection decisions and services across the country, highlighted issues raised by a 
lack of agreed or generally accepted process. The Report identified heavy reliance on 
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professional judgement as a potential problem for public justice in terms of differences in 
services and decision-making (Report of Auditor General of Norway, 2012). 
 
Professional judgement is clearly important in assessment: social workers are continuously 
in situations where a decision has to be made based on complex, multifaceted and often 
contradictory information (Turney, Platt, Selwyn & Farmer, 2012). While assessment 
frameworks, procedures and tools can help to support good decision-making, they also run 
the risk of being used in ways that reduce rather than promote effective critical and 
analytical thinking (Calder, 2004; Turney, 2014). And the ability to think well is essential, 
when the high level of uncertainty characterising many child protection issues means there 
is no perfect algorithm to ensure ‘the right answer’ is reached in any given situation. So if the 
aim is to reach the best possible decision based on the best information available, we need 
to consider how assessment practice can be framed to allow appropriate use of frameworks 
and tools alongside the reliable and effective use of professional judgement (as 
recommended by Munro, 2011), without falling into an over-reliance on individualised 
decision making with the potential difficulties identified within the Norwegian system.  
 
So in this paper, we explore the role of professional judgement in assessment in these two 
child protection systems (England – Norway). We consider how the different approaches to 
professional judgement in assessment have developed, discuss how the concept is 
understood and applied within each national framework, and ask what we can learn from 
each in terms of best assessment practice. Acknowledging child protection as an area of 
uncertainty – a ‘wicked problem’ (Devaney & Spratt, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973) - we 
propose a model of Grounded Professional Judgement based on notions of epistemic 
accountability and responsibility as a way forward. While this paper discusses systems and 
practices in two specific contexts, we suggest that dealing with situations of complexity and 
uncertainty is core to social work practice, so the issues raised here will have relevance to 
practice in other national settings. 
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Social work assessment in England and Norway: structures and practices 
In this section, we set out the context for our discussion of the role and meaning of 
professional judgement by looking at the different approaches to social work assessment in 
England and Norway.  
 
Partly as a result of perceived failures in practice, evidenced by serious cases of abuse and 
neglect, national procedures for child and family assessment were introduced in England. 
Between 1970 and 1985, 35 public inquiries were conducted in relation to serious cases of 
child neglect and abuse by caregivers, where the Child Protection system had failed to reveal 
and/or prevent maltreatment (Bochel, Bochel, Pages & Sykes, 2009). This led to extensive 
public debate, and social workers were criticized for not recognizing the symptoms of child 
abuse, and for putting too much emphasis on cooperating with the adults at the cost of the 
children.  
 
The UK Department of Health introduced guidance (Department of Health, 1988) for social 
workers undertaking what were then referred to as ‘comprehensive’ assessments. This 
guidance, known as the ‘Orange Book’, remained in place until the publication of the 
Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families (DH et al., 2000) which 
followed the introduction of the Children Act 1989.  The new assessment framework (AF) 
was explicitly ‘evidence-based’, drawing extensively on research findings (DH et al., 2000; 
Holland, 2010) and was designed to ‘provide a systematic way of analysing, understanding 
and recording what is happening to children and young people within their families and the 
wider context in which they live’ (DH et al., 2000: 8).  
 
The AF identified three key ‘domains’ - the child’s developmental needs; parenting capacity; 
and family and environmental factors  - to be addressed in any assessment in order to build 
a holistic understanding of the child’s circumstances, and represented these as the three 
inter-connected arms of a triangle (see Fig. 1 below). As the figure shows, each side of the 
triangle identifies further specific issues to be investigated. National and local procedures for 
conducting assessments were introduced, along with an electronic information management 
and recording system, the Integrated Children’s System (ICS). The guidance set strict 
timescales to be followed (7 days, later increased to 10, for an ‘initial’ assessment and 35 
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days for a more substantial ‘core’ assessment), and ICS provided formats for reports and 
recording at each stage. Whilst intended to move away from the ‘check list’ or rather 
mechanistic approach to assessment that had been identified in some inspection reports in 
relation to the use of the Orange Book, the AF introduced a structured case management 
model that included a range of bureaucratic procedures and prescribed information 
management and recording systems. 
 
 
Fig 1: The Assessment Framework, Source: DH et al (2000a: 17). 
 
While the introduction of the AF produced some encouraging results (Cleaver & Walker, 
2004), the increased bureaucratisation and proceduralisation that accompanied its 
implementation also had a range of unintended negative consequences (summarised by 
Parton, 2014: 103) that have taken some time to address – and are still not entirely resolved. 
In particular, studies have drawn attention to the effects on practice of the introduction of 
the ICS, alongside a framework of tightly monitored performance indicators, noting that 
time spent by social workers managing computerised information systems took them away 
from face-to-face work with children and families; pressurised practitioners resorted to a 
range of tactics to allow them to meet bureaucratic demands and management targets 
which in turn introduced grater possibilities for error; and the scope for discretion and the 
exercise of professional judgement was curtailed  (see, for example, Broadhurst et al., 2010; 
Munro, 2011; White et al., 2010). Furthermore, a fundamental difficulty of the managerial 
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approach discussed above is that the attempt to reduce discretion and standardise practice 
fails to take account of the fact that “not all processes can be validly standardised without 
compromising safety” (Featherstone et al., 2014: 82), a point we return to later in the paper 
when we consider the nature of social work as a ‘wicked problem’. 
 
Since Munro’s (2011) report highlighting these difficulties in child protection practice – 
particularly the effects of the dominance of a compliance culture at the expense of one that 
fosters critical and analytical thinking and the confident and competent use of professional 
judgement – a number of changes have been introduced in England, in relation to 
assessment: a revised version of the statutory guidance, Working Together (HM 
Government, 2013) removed the requirement to conduct separate initial and core 
assessment, and indicated that “local authorities should determine their local assessment 
processes through a local protocol” (p24). At the same time, it also downgraded the status of 
the AF, moving it from its central position as statutory guidance to one of a number of items 
of ‘supplementary guidance’ contained in an Appendix. Parton (2014: 131) identifies a 
further significant change in the 2013 version, with the introduction of a specific focus on 
the understanding, assessment and management of risk:  
“while the concept of risk had been consciously removed from the Assessment 
Framework from the outset (Seden et al., 20010 and hence from Working Together in 
1999 (DH et al., 1999), 2006 (HM Government, 2006b) and 2010 (HM Government, 
2010a) in order to ensure the centrality of the concept of ‘need’, it was explicitly 
introduced into the 2013 document (HM Government, 2013)”.  
 
It is interesting to note that the AF is not specifically mentioned/referenced at all in the 
latest iteration of Working Together (HM Government, 2015) although the underpinning 
principles (and the familiar ‘Assessment triangle’) have been retained, as has the overall 
time frame of 45 days for completion of an assessment. Alongside this re-positioning of the 
AF, a number of authorities have adopted alternative frameworks for assessment and 
planning; one of the most significant of these is Signs of Safety (Turnell and Edwards, 1999), 
an approach that sees “risk assessment as the heart of constructive child protection 
practice” (Government of Western Australia Child Protection Department, 2011: 12). 
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Norway has a long tradition of child welfare services, since it was the first country in the 
world to have a public child protection system (Stang-Dahl, 1978). The Norwegian system is 
less risk-based than the English system, and more centred on children’s and families’ broad 
needs for services and interventions (Christiansen, 2011). In Norwegian, the word for the 
child protection system incorporates both the protection and welfare dimensions that are 
separate in the English language. The main assessment guidelines are the basic principles of 
the Child Welfare Act (CWA) 1993, combined with a deadline of three months for completing 
the assessment. The principles of the CWA are: to work ‘in the best interest of the child’; to 
use the ‘least intrusive act’ when intervening; and to observe ‘the biological principle’. 
Norway has no other mandatory elements in relation to assessment, apart from the 
timeframe. However, municipalities have the power to introduce child protection 
assessment frameworks if they so choose – and increasingly, assessment ‘packages’ are 
being purchased and introduced. Broadly, the lack of externally imposed structure is 
consistent with the idea that professional judgement is the main component in social 
workers` assessments when there are child protection concerns. An assessment should take 
place when the child appears to have a ‘special need for interventions and support’ (Kane, 
2006) but the practitioner decides independently when this is the case, and then the best 
way to investigate the concern. So the amount and kind of information gathered, and the 
process for gathering it, will depend on the particular situation and the professional 
judgement made about the situation. Although it is not mandatory to write a final 
assessment report, it is common to produce some kind of record after an assessment is 
finished, either in the form of a report or a note in the child’s file.  
 
This flexibility and lack of externally specified procedure has resulted in local variations 
across the country, and this has been noted as a matter of concern in a recent national 
report by the Auditor General of Norway (2012). The report related to an investigation 
carried out by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) into the functioning of municipal child 
welfare services, particularly the services’ ability to meet certain requirements of the Child 
Welfare Act at a time when there had also been “significant growth in the number of 
children subject to child welfare measures”. The report suggested, inter alia, that too much 
emphasis on professional judgement and too few procedures could be a problem in 
8 
 
Norwegian assessments, with child protection case-management practices and interventions 
differing significantly both between and within municipalities. It showed for example that a 
large number of referrals that were not followed up, were evaluated as requiring assessment 
when they were reviewed by other social workers in other districts (although of course this 
could happen in more proceduralised systems, too).  
 
Having considered these two assessment models and their impact on practice, we note that 
while the Munro review implies the need for changes in the UK that would move assessment 
processes more towards Norwegian norms, the Auditor General’s report implies the need 
for more structure to support a higher level of consistency in response (Samsonsen & 
Willumsen, 2014). 
 
Professional judgement: comparing two contexts 
We have noted that assessments are carried out in accordance with certain underpinning 
principles, as outlined in both the CA 1989 and the CWA 1992. But these general principles 
do not offer any guidance as to how they should be interpreted in any given case. So, for 
example, while the principle that social workers should act ‘in the child’s best interest’ can 
be clearly stated, it may not always be equally clear what a social worker should actually do 
in a particular situation, to work in accordance with that principle. This indeterminacy 
creates room for normative personal evaluations and decisions – ie it introduces an element 
of individual discretion into the process and calls for the exercise of professional judgement. 
In using the term ‘professional judgement’, we follow Taylor’s definition: 
We define professional judgement to be when a professional considers the evidence 
about a client or family situation in the light of professional knowledge to reach a 
conclusion or recommendation. 
 (Taylor, 2013: 10; see also Taylor, 2012) 
 
Child protection social workers can in many ways be pictured as “street-level bureaucrats” 
(Lipsky, 1980) handling the practice aspects of social policy. Where the formal powers of the 
bureaucracy are set by politicians, the informal powers – including the ability to exercise 
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discretion - are acted out by these “street-level” bureaucrats (Ibid.) The discretionary powers 
of welfare state professionals can be troublesome in different ways: they can threaten the 
predictability, legality and equality of responses and this raises some democratic issues 
concerning public control. Furthermore, professional judgements are difficult to predict and 
control, and the same case may be judged differently, even by professionals with the 
equivalent knowledge base and level of experience, based upon different logic and 
reasoning (Molander, Grimen & Eriksen, 2012). However, discretionary work can also be 
seen as providing ‘opportunities’ in the way it designates room for autonomy in judgements 
and decisions (Ibid.).  
 
Conducting an assessment is a complex process of making sense of a large amount of 
information concerning a child and family (Ibid.) In order to reach a decision about how to 
respond to identified needs. Good decision-making is critically important in social work, 
where everyday practice can involve very high-risk situations. Dealing with these situations 
calls for sense making and processing of information from different sources, to form a 
professional judgement. The use of professional judgement in social work reflects the need 
for flexibility and adjustment to individual needs and situations.  At the same time though, 
the use of professional judgement raises the possibility of arbitrariness and/or poor 
decisions based on personal biases. An international literature review by Stewart and 
Thompson (2004) regarding human decision making in the child protection system, stressed 
social workers’ faults and errors in reasoning, corresponding with Tversky and Kahneman’s 
classic work on errors in reasoning (1974). Even the best professional is a “victim” of human 
heuristics: thinking in categories, over estimating individual features of cases, remembering 
new experiences more clearly than older ones, etc (see also Holland, 2010). Taken together, 
these points perhaps suggest that practice might be better served by reliance on more 
‘scientific’ or actuarial approaches.  
 
The role of risk assessment techniques versus clinical judgement is an ongoing discussion 
and tension in social work. Indeed, the research on human decision making is in favour of 
more predictive risk assessment models (Munro, 1999; Stewart & Thompson, 2004). 
However, the lack of ability to “tailor” risk assessment instruments will produce both false 
negatives and false positives: Some children will not be considered “at risk” even though risk 
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factors in parenting are revealed, and some children will be harmed despite evaluations 
suggesting they are at low risk (Gambrill & Shlonsky, 2000). On balance then, while it has 
limitations, eliminating professional judgement in professions like social work, and in child 
protection more specifically, is not an option because it is not possible to devise reliable 
decision making rules to cover such complex situations (Featherstone et al., 2014; Molander, 
2013). So rather than trying to find ways to remove or overly circumscribe the use of 
professional judgement in assessment, our aim is try and shed light on how it can be used to 
support good decision-making by social workers. 
 
Professional judgement is a concept that features internationally within social work (and 
other professions). However, both the external social/cultural/economic and the internal 
organisational contexts in which it is exercised are of considerable importance. In England, 
tragedies like the deaths from maltreatment of Victoria Climbié in 2000 and Peter Connelly 
(’Baby P’) in 2007 have been extensively debated in the media. The government response to 
these debates has been to implement major reviews of services (Laming, 2009; Munro, 
2011; Social Work Task Force, 2009), which have, in turn, led to social policy reforms with 
direct impacts on child protection assessment. The Norwegian governmental response to 
criticism of its child protection service has been very different, with a central White Paper 
outlining the decision to transfer more resources into the system in the form of staff, 
interventions and continuing professional development for social workers already employed 
(NOU 2000:12, p 111), and this way of responding has continued up to the present.  
 
These contrasting responses at government level reflect the different understandings of, or 
expectations about, the role of professional judgement in assessment. Norway has 
continued to emphasise the importance of professional judgement as a key to good quality 
assessment, and has introduced policy to ensure that there is the ‘room’ for this kind of 
reflection, reasoning and decision making by enhancing the resources in terms of time and 
education. Policy in England, on the other hand, has moved in a different direction 
(Featherstone, White & Wastell, 2012; Parton, 2014). Instead of viewing professional 
judgement as an important factor in the process, it seems to have been regarded more as a 
threat to ensuring safety. So, the response has been a downplaying of the role of 
professional judgement in favour of an increasing amount of bureaucracy and procedure; 
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the rationale appears to be that that circumscribing the discretionary space available to 
practitioners will (help to) prevent tragedies. 
 
In England, the media have played an important role in orchestrating the public debates 
about child protection and the role of social work in the wake of particular high-profile child 
death cases (see, for example, Jones, 2014; Warner, 2013 and 2014). Typically, the picture 
painted in the press shows social workers as unable to exercise effective professional 
judgement. Public reaction in England following the deaths of Victoria Climbié and, later, 
Peter Connelly was amplified by the media, particularly the tabloid press where the response 
to the professionals held to be responsible for failure to protect Peter was vitriolic; simply 
stated, the only possible outcome was: ‘heads must roll’ (Warner, 2013). Warner comments 
on the way ‘politicians, in conjunction with the press, actively mobilised public anger 
towards social work through their responses’ and further suggests that ‘politicians and the 
press had a shared mutual interest in the co-authorship of “bad” stories about social work’ 
(2014: 1637).  
 
This has not been the case in Norway, where even the tabloid press presents the views of a 
wide array of claim-makers including, for example, academics, promoting more balanced 
reporting and discussion (Green, 2008). Thus a comparable case to that of Peter Connelly 
elicited a very different public response. In 2005, Kristoffer Kihle Gjerstad (aged 8) died at 
the hands of his stepfather. In terms of public reaction, the only individuals who were 
directly blamed were the killer (who was convicted of his murder) and Kristoffer`s mother 
(who was convicted for not protecting her son). Kristoffer‘s grandmother fronted the debate 
into what could be learned from this case (Gangdal, 2010). In the case of Silje Redergard, 
who was killed by two 6 year old children, agreement was reached across the media not to 
write about this case in a sensationalist way, in sharp contrast to the similar case of James 
Bulger in England at around the same time.    
 
The media responses in England and Norway to these high profile child death cases show the 
substantial differences between public discourses in England and Norway, especially with 
regard to cultures of blame and responsibility, which in turn affect the role of and views on 
professional judgement as a component in child protection assessment. Green (2008) 
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suggests that different political cultures, and the structures that sustain them, create 
different incentives to respond to such crimes. In England, where the adversarial system 
requires that any opportunity is used to exploit perceived weaknesses in political opponents, 
both majority parties responded loudly and clearly to these high-profile cases. Norway’s 
multi-party system, based more on consensus and compromise, offers fewer incentives to 
use child fatalities as a means to gain political capital.  
 
A final external factor to mention here is the way the broad economic context in each 
country has affected public services generally and social work in particular. In England, there 
has been a sustained period of government spending cuts, with the result that local 
authority budgets have decreased significantly. These cuts have led to reductions in welfare 
services, tighter eligibility criteria for access to services, and decreasing levels of resource. 
Along with this ‘squeeze’ on local government services, there has been increased pressure 
on the voluntary sector, where funding streams have also been affected. Norway on the 
other hand, is still perceived as a wealthy country mainly because of the oil industry, and has 
not yet experienced the economic difficulties facing many other European countries at this 
point. Even though there has been a political shift in Norway, to give conservative parties a 
larger role in the coalition government (in 2013), the country still consider itself to be a 
social democracy, with ideals of a high level of government intervention and redistribution 
of resources within the population. A high tax-level combined with well-established public 
services eg in health care and schooling, has maintained a level of social equality, with low 
differences in income.  
 
As previously outlined, Norway has a long tradition of child welfare service provision, and 
since the social democratic political culture is based on solidarity and a high degree of 
governmental intervention (Gilbert, Parton & Skivenes, 2011), there appears to be common 
agreement on the need for a good ‘resource flow’ into the child welfare system. A recent 
small-scale comparative study highlights the impact of these differences in resource, 
especially in terms of work-pressures for English and Norwegian social workers doing 
assessments (Samsonsen & Willumsen, 2014). The English social workers reported higher 
case-loads, worked longer hours and had access to fewer resources and interventions than 
their Norwegian counterparts in the study. 
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Research regarding good professional judgement in social work underlines the importance of 
organisational culture; the immediate context for practice can have a profound effect on 
social workers’ own confidence in exercising professional judgement based on a 
combination of academic/research-informed knowledge and practice wisdom/tacit 
knowledge (Turney et al., 2012). In addition, good quality supervision and support has been 
identified as a factor in helping social workers arrive at the best possible professional 
judgement (Laming, 2003). In terms of assessments, we can never be absolutely certain we 
are ‘getting it right’; but sound professional judgement supported by analytical and critical 
thinking, and the purposive use of assessment tools/measures when appropriate, can help 
practitioners reach good quality decisions (Brown & Turney, 2014).  
 
Child protection as a ‘wicked problem’? 
As noted, England and Norway have chosen different strategies to target and respond to 
child abuse and neglect. The English assessment model focuses on risk prediction, based on 
research on risk factors, whereas the Norwegian approach in general focuses on families’ 
needs over risk predictions. How can we account for the different directions England and 
Norway have moved in, to address ostensibly the same problem? 
 
One explanation may lie in the way the ‘problem’ is defined in the first place. Different ways 
of understanding child abuse have been identified and responses have been categorised in 
terms of either a ‘child protection’ or a ‘family service’ orientation (Gilbert et al., 2011), and 
these in turn have typically mapped on to particular political systems (Khoo 2004; Gilbert et 
al., 2011). England is commonly placed within the ‘child protection’ and Norway the ‘child 
welfare’ systems.  Assessments in England emphasise risk predictions to detect and prevent 
maltreatment, whereas assessments in Norway focus on families’ needs for tailored services 
to prevent further negative developments (Samsonsen & Willumsen, 2014).  A focus on risk 
and short-term outcomes tends to fit with a technical-rational approach to the management 
of child abuse. A focus on needs and longer-term outcomes, however, moves away from the 
idea of a technical response and suggests an understanding of child abuse as an altogether 
more complex issue (Devaney & Spratt, 2009).   
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These different ways of responding can be understood as reflecting different interpretations 
of the ‘problem’ of child abuse. Following Devaney and Spratt (2009), we suggest that Rittel 
and Webber’s (1973) distinction between ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ problems is helpful here. 
Based on their analysis of planning for social issues, they identified critical differences in 
complexity in relation to both problem definitions and solutions between the kinds of 
problems addressed by science and social policy. ‘Tame’ problems are not necessarily 
simple, but can be tightly defined and have solutions that are ‘findable’, if difficult 
(Southgate, Reynolds & Howley, 2013). ‘Wicked’ problems, by contrast, are both difficult to 
define clearly and highly resistant to resolution (Australian Government, 2007; Rittel & 
Weber, 1973). When wicked problems are discussed and targeted, a variety of 
interpretations and responses may be identified; each version of the problem has an 
element of truth, but no version captures the whole picture, because the whole picture may 
not be amenable to ‘capture’. When targeted, one solution may give rise to another 
problem, because of internal conflicting goals and disagreement among stakeholders 
(Australian Government, 2007). Child abuse may be viewed as a wicked problem in terms of 
its complexity and its high level of resistance to solution (Devaney & Spratt, 2009).  
 
‘Ensuring safety’ is an expression used in the context of assessment in England – indeed, it is 
one of the categories against which parenting capacity is assessed in the AF (DH et al., 2000). 
Public debates after child deaths seem to rest on the belief that it should have been possible 
for someone – usually the social worker(s) involved - to have controlled the ‘problem’ and 
forestalled the tragic outcome (whose inevitability, with hindsight, is of course clear). With 
that assumption, the introduction of standardized procedures to control the situation 
through risk-minimising appears to offer a plausible solution. In Norway, when child abuse is 
debated, rather than introducing standardised procedures, there has been an increase in 
resources in terms of staff, interventions and post-qualifying education and training, as an 
attempt to target the same problem. These different approaches sit at opposite ends of a 
continuum and arguably reflect different ways of framing ‘the problem’. Risk management 
can be seen as an attempt to respond to child protection as a tame problem, an issue to be 
controlled and solved (‘ensuring safety’), and invites a technical-rational, linear response 
(procedure). In Norway, on the other hand, where child abuse seems to be framed as a 
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‘wicked’ problem, the nature of the response changes and does not seek to rely on a search 
for general ‘solutions’. Norway`s strong emphasis on responding to need seems to reflect a 
lack of trust in risk management in this context, and recognition that an overly 
proceduralised response to child protection concerns is unlikely to be effective.   
 
There are potential pitfalls at each end of this continuum: as we have seen, the temptation 
to treat child protection as amenable to control in ways that are in fact more suitable for 
tame problems has not been successful. The move towards more proceduralisation in 
England has not been found to be as effective as hoped (Munro, 2011), and has undermined 
confidence in and capacity for critical thinking and use of professional judgement. 
Furthermore, the idea that social workers can categorically ‘ensure safety’ is flawed, and it is 
therefore problematic that they should be individually held responsible if they fail to do so. 
At the other end of the continuum, accepting child protection as a wicked problem may lead 
some practitioners to become paralysed by the level of complexity they face and feel 
incapable of action; this in turn may result in them trying to mask this difficulty by appealing 
to the use of professional judgement, and thus effectively shutting down any questioning of 
their position.  
 
While the pitfalls associated with framing child protection as a wicked problem need to be 
acknowledged, this conceptualisation puts the notion of professional judgement right at the 
heart of assessment and decision making. The question that then arises is how can we best 
‘manage’ the element of personal discretion that is brought into play through the exercise of 
professional judgement? More particularly, how can practitioners exercise professional 
judgement in this field of uncertainty without sliding in to a situation where ‘anything goes’? 
 
A Model of ‘Grounded Professional Judgement’: epistemic accountability and responsibility 
As we have noted, if the notion of child protection as a wicked problem is accepted, then the 
rationale for having proceduralised responses in situations of uncertainty becomes less 
secure, and the need to develop ways to navigate the discretionary space that opens up 
becomes more acute. In this context, then, the role of professional judgement takes on a 
particular significance. But as the Norwegian experience suggests, unfettered or 
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unchallenged use of professional judgement is potentially as problematic as over-reliance on 
protocols and procedures. How then can we frame a use of professional judgement that is 
flexible and sensitive to the particularities of the unique situations practitioners encounter 
but nonetheless reliable, robust and accountable?  Our response is to propose an approach 
we call ‘Grounded Professional Judgement’ (GPJ) that is characterised by a commitment to 
epistemic accountability and epistemic responsibility. We will briefly discuss these two 
concepts and then go on to consider what GPJ might look like for everyday practice. 
 
The broad concept of accountability has become identified as one of the core values of 
democracy (Mulgan, 2003). Accountability in relation to professional judgement is 
connected to a process where the professionals are made responsible for their decisions and 
actions, and this is seen to be a method of keeping the public properly informed (ibid.). 
Accountability in this sense provides a form of ‘answerability’, illustrating the need for public 
control with regard to professional judgements (Molander, 2013). There are different ways 
that a profession can be made accountable. A key distinction is between structural and 
epistemic accountability. The primary goal of structural accountability is control: structural 
measures are designed to restrict and manage the space for discretionary 
activity/judgement. The main objective of epistemic accountability, however, is ‘to improve 
the conditions for and the quality of reasoning’ within such discretionary space (ibid: 215). In 
child protection, mechanisms for imposing structural accountability include legislation and 
statutory guidance, the requirements of regulatory agencies, and the proceduralisation of 
tasks within the organization. Mechanisms for epistemic accountability, on the other hand, 
include the formal education of social workers – in particular in so far as this promotes good 
reasoning and reflective skills – and effective support systems, such as supervision, where 
practitioners` reasoning processes can be explored and challenged.  
 
Introducing the notion of epistemic accountability brings with it a requirement to think 
about what we know and how we know it – what claims social workers can make about their 
knowledge base and what grounds it. This includes acknowledging the limits to knowledge 
and ‘owning’ their own uncertainties, and ‘conceptualising uncertainty as a rigorous, 
intellectually robust and ethical position, rather than a sign of weakness or equivocation’ 
(Daniel, 2005: 60). It is of course important to recognise that social workers cannot have 
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perfect knowledge. But not knowing everything is not the same as knowing nothing at all 
(Mason, 2005); and the fact that there is frequently no one ‘right’ answer to the situations 
practitioners encounter need not consign us to a world where ‘anything goes’. Professionals 
will bring expertise and experience to bear on each new situation and there may still be 
yardsticks for assessing the relative merits of different potential responses, to help 
practitioners to make the best decisions they can in difficult circumstances. Indeed, social 
work ethics requires practitioners to think critically and reflectively about their own 
processes of reasoning and the grounds on which they base their professional judgements.  
 
Taking this requirement seriously invites consideration of the role of `epistemic 
responsibility`.  
‘To be epistemically responsible is to display in one’s reasoning the virtue (or virtues) 
epistemic internalists take to be central to warrant or justification, e.g., coherence, 
having good reasons, fitting the evidence’ (Bishop, 2000: 180; see also Code, 1987).  
These criteria seem very apposite in the context of social work assessment and to offer 
useful reference points for considering the quality of decision-making. As we have seen, 
social work in England has become something of a ‘pariah profession’ (Green, 2006) with low 
perceived academic and professional status, and a lack of external credibility. Social workers 
have in many cases experienced a form of ‘testimonial injustice’ (Fricker, 2007). By this we 
mean a situation where ‘a speaker receives a deflated degree of credibility from a hearer 
owing to prejudice on the hearer’s part [… It involves] the idea of being wronged in one’s 
capacity as a knower’ (Fricker, 2008: 69).  So there is work to be done to restore confidence 
in practitioners’ ability to exercise professional judgement. Epistemically responsible 
assessments, ie those that demonstrably meet the criteria of ‘coherence, having good 
reasons, [and] fitting the evidence’, will affirm the practitioner’s ‘capacity as a knower’ and 
provide a reliable basis for decision making.  
  
Bringing GPJ into practice  
Everyday practice in child protection is riven with challenge, uncertainty and complexity, 
regardless of service framework and procedures. GPJ tries to address this complexity 
through epistemically responsible processes of critical thinking and reflection on an 
individual level. Practitioners should be able, and should expect, to give detailed accounts of 
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how they have reached a decision; that is, they must demonstrate epistemic responsibility 
by showing how their analysis meets the criteria of coherence, good reasons, and a sense of 
‘fit’ with the available best evidence. Such accounts will also include an honest appraisal of 
what is not known, what does not ‘fit’, and any uncertainties about the validity of the 
reasoning process - and this will not be possible in a culture of fear, compliance or blame.     
 
Therefore the nature of the organisational context is critical. Lillrank and Liukko (2004: 44) 
offer a helpful perspective on what is needed: ‘Non-routine situations are best managed by 
indirect means, such as competence, improvement and professional values, visions and 
missions”. These elements go along with an organisational culture focused on support and 
learning, for example through the provision of adequate reflective but challenging 
supervision, colleague support, manageable case loads and proper interventions to meet the 
needs of the families after assessments, together with public trust (Samsonsen & Willumsen, 
2014; Munro, 2011), all contributing to a structure of epistemic accountability. While there is 
no quick fix, measures such as the development of a Professional Capabilities Framework, to 
act as an over-arching set of standards outlining expectations of social workers across every 
stage of their careers, and the introduction of an Assessed and Supported Year in 
Employment for all newly qualified social workers in England, with its clear expectations 
abut the role and importance of reflective supervision, may be pointers towards a more 
epistemically accountable approach.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have discussed social work, and more particularly child protection, 
assessment in two different countries, England and Norway, in order to reflect on different 
approaches towards professional judgement in practice. While this comparative approach 
has allowed us to focus on these two systems in some detail, we propose that consideration 
of the meaning and role of professional judgement has broader relevance, as the need for 
social workers to be able to make good decisions in situations of complexity and uncertainty 
is not confined to these specific national contexts.  
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The way child protection problems are framed, either as ‘tame’ or ‘wicked, seems to play an 
important role in how governments approach the role of professional judgement in 
assessment practice. Defining the professional task as one of ‘ensuring safety’ assumes a 
soluble (ie ‘tame’) problem and may lead to measures aimed at increasing the levels of 
bureaucratisation and proceduralisation - that is to say, using mechanisms of structural 
accountability to control the room for professional judgement. Alternatively, acknowledging 
the complexity and uncertainty of practice and seeing child protection as a ‘wicked’ problem 
may lead to an approach that addresses the need for professional judgement more directly 
and looks for mechanisms of epistemic accountability to provide appropriate support for its 
exercise.  
 
However, neither response is problem-free. Where professional judgement is viewed 
normatively, and seen as in some sense above challenge, then there is no requirement to 
clarify what kind (or quality) of thinking processes are involved. An absence of structures and 
procedures may therefore be naïve in terms of epistemic accountability and responsibility, 
and set up professional judgement as a kind of ‘black box’: inputs and outputs can be 
identified, but the internal processes connecting them are not available for scrutiny, 
understanding, or challenge. On the other hand, constraining the discretionary space within 
which practitioners can operate has raised its own difficulties, particularly in terms of 
undermining their confidence and competence in relation to critical and analytical thinking 
(Munro, 2011).  
 
The response we propose is one that foregrounds what we have called ‘Grounded 
Professional Judgement’. In terms of understanding the implications of this notion, we 
suggest that it occupies a defensible middle position between those currently reflected in 
the assessment systems in England and Norway. Retaining the commitment to the use of 
professional discretion, it nonetheless provides a structure within which judgement can be 
exercised more rigorously, transparently and in a way that can be called to account. In this 
way, GPJ provides a counterbalance to the potential idiosyncrasy of decision making in a 
context where professional judgement is elevated to a point where it is beyond challenge or 
critique. At the same time, in a system where the space for discretion has been reduced at 
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the expense of increased procedure and bureaucracy, it provides a framework within which 
professional judgement can be ‘reclaimed’ by social workers and built back in to practice. 
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